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Abstract
African American bankruptcy filers are more likely to select Chapter 13 than other
debtors, who opt instead for Chapter 7, which has higher success rates and lower
attorney fees. Prior scholarship blames racial discrimination by bankruptcy attorneys.
We present an alternative explanation: Chapter 13 offers benefits, including retention
of assets such as cars and driver’s licenses, that are more valuable to African American
debtors because they have relatively long commutes. We take advantage of a 2011
policy in Chicago, which suspended driver’s licenses of consumers with large traffic-
related debts. The policy produced a large increase in Chapter 13 filings, especially
by African Americans. Two mechanisms explain the disparate racial impact: African
Americans were more likely to have traffic-related debts and they incurred greater
costs from license suspension due to their relatively long commutes. When we match
African Americans to other debtors with similar commutes, we find no racial difference
in the propensity to file for Chapter 13. These findings suggest that racial disparities in
bankruptcy reflect racial disparities in commuting.
JEL classification: D14, D12, G33, K35, R20
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Race, Chapter 13, Chicago
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1 Introduction
Among those who file for bankruptcy, African Americans are substantially more likely
to select Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 when compared to white debtors. This has been doc-
umented in prior scholarship by Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless (2012), and has been the
subject of media coverage in the New York Times (Bernard (2012)), The Atlantic (Kiel (2017)),
and ProPublica (Sanchez and Kambhampati (2018)). This apparent “racial sorting” into
Chapter 13 is worrisome because a Chapter 13 filing is substantially more costly, more
time consuming, and less likely to discharge debts than a Chapter 7 filing, as discussed
by Morrison and Uettwiller (2017). Attorney fees are more than twice as expensive ($2,600
instead of $1,000), payments to unsecured creditors are substantially larger (because some
Chapter 13 trustees demand minimum recoveries to these creditors), a Chapter 13 plan
takes three to five years to complete (Chapter 7 cases complete within about 4 months),
and around two-thirds of Chapter 13 cases terminate without a discharge of debts (this
happens in less than four percent of Chapter 7 cases). A commonly cited reason for using
Chapter 13, instead of Chapter 7, is to shelter assets that would otherwise be liquidated
in Chapter 7. Chapter 13 allows a consumer to discharge debt by giving up future in-
come (all disposable income earned over a three to five year period); Chapter 7 allows the
consumer to discharge debt by giving up assets, such as cars and houses. Chapter 13 is,
therefore, often described as a device for “saving your home,” as argued by White and Zhu
(2010). Yet this commonly cited explanation for preferring Chapter 13 seems implausible
for the vast majority of filings by African Americans, most of whom have few or no assets
vulnerable to liquidation in Chapter 7. A more plausible explanation for these patterns is
racial discrimination by bankruptcy attorneys, who may be more likely to “steer” African
Americans into Chapter 13 than their white counterparts. Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless
(2012) present experimental evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
This paper tests an alternative hypothesis: In some areas of the United States, finan-
cially distressed African Americans are more likely to benefit from Chapter 13 than other
consumers. A Chapter 13 filing not only allows consumers to retain assets, but also forces
the return of assets that have been seized. These assets include physical property, such as
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cars and homes, as well as government permits, such as driver’s licenses. These benefits are
generally unavailable in Chapter 7, as discussed in detail below (Section 2). The benefits of
Chapter 13 could be more valuable to African Americans than to other debtors for at least
two reasons: (i) African Americans may be more likely to accumulate and default on debts
that entitle creditors to seize assets that cannot be sheltered in Chapter 7; and (ii) they may
face higher costs of asset seizure. Using data from Chicago and supporting evidence from
other major cities, we show in this paper that both (i) and (ii) are important determinants
of Chapter 13 filing decisions by African Americans and explain much of the difference in
filing rates between African Americans and other debtors.
We study a natural experiment in Chicago. When Rahm Emanuel took office as Mayor
in 2011, he announced a policy that increased city enforcement of outstanding traffic and
parking debts. Chicago identified drivers with large accumulated debts and commenced
proceedings to suspend their driver’s licenses. The Emanuel policy had a much larger ef-
fect in African American neighborhoods than other areas. The city identified substantially
more drivers (per capita) with large accumulated debts and suspended substantially more
licenses (per capita) in predominantly African American zip codes than in other zip codes.
This caused an increase in Chapter 13 filings throughout the city, with a much larger in-
crease among African Americans, even though Chapter 7 filings were declining. Indeed,
Chicago-area attorneys specifically advertised Chapter 13 as a solution for consumers fac-
ing license suspensions and vehicle seizures due to unpaid traffic debts.1 Among con-
sumers who filed for bankruptcy, the probability of choosing Chapter 13 (instead of Chap-
ter 7) increased across all races, but the increase was 10 percentage points larger among
African Americans. Among car-owning consumers who chose Chapter 13, the share of
filings by African Americans had been declining prior to the Emanuel policy. After the
policy went on-line, the African American share reversed trend and increased from 42% in
1Websites for leading Chicago-area firms included such statements as “Stop Chicago Tickets. Eliminate
All Penalties & Fees. Get Your License Back. The state will suspend your driver’s license for unpaid Chicago
parking tickets. A DebtStoppers bankruptcy plan can wipe out all parking ticket debt and get your license
re-instated immediately.” (web.archive.org/web/20140208010235/https://www.debtstoppers.com/) (Feb.
8, 2014); “CHAPTER 13 CAN BE THE SOLUTION (1 Payment) ... Lawsuits & License Suspension & Parking
Tickets” (web.archive.org/web/20111205044445/http://www.infotapes.com/webB/Chapter13.htm) (Dec.
5, 2011); “Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Helps Pay Off Parking Tickets.”
(davidmsiegel.com/repay-parking-tickets-over-a-five-year-period-bankruptcy/ (Dec. 7, 2013)
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2011 to 55% in 2015.
These findings show that African Americans were more likely to accumulate city debt,
more likely to be targeted by city enforcement efforts, and consequently were more likely
to file Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases in response to the Emanuel policy compared to con-
sumers from other racial groups. The Emanuel policy thus produced a racial disparity that
has previously been attributed to “steering” by bankruptcy attorneys. We find additional
evidence indicating that African Americans experienced higher costs, on average, from li-
cense suspension. When we control for the number of license suspensions per zip code,
we continue to find a larger increase in Chapter 13 filings in African American zip codes,
indicating a higher sensitivity to license suspensions. Consistent with this interpretation,
the post-Emanuel policy increase in Chapter 13 filings is largest in African American zip
codes with relatively long commutes to work (defined by the percentage of residents com-
muting more than 45 minutes). By contrast, among zip codes with short commutes, we
see little or no difference between African American and non-African American zip codes.
These findings suggest that the differential response to the Emanuel policy—with African
Americans filing Chapter 13 cases at higher rates than other consumers—is attributable in
part to differences in the value of retaining automobiles. On average, African Americans
may have longer commutes to work and live in areas that are farther away from schools,
medical services, and supermarkets. We test this hypothesis by matching African Amer-
ican bankruptcy filers to non-African American filers based on consumer characteristics,
including estimated distance to work and on debt to the City of Chicago. Within this
matched sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are no racial differences in
the probability of choosing Chapter 13 after the Emanuel policy comes on-line.
We conclude that observed racial disparities in bankruptcy are attributable, in large
part, to underlying differences in the background characteristics (especially commuting
times) between African American and other consumers. African Americans are more likely,
on average, to experience debt enforcement actions, including seizure of a car or driver’s
license. African Americans are also more likely, on average, to need that car or license for
commuting to work.
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We explore alternative explanations for our findings, including the possibility that
the post-policy increase in Chapter 13 filings is attributable to liquidity constraints faced
by African American consumers, not to a desire to recover suspended driver’s licenses.
Bankruptcy attorney fees generally must be paid up-front when a consumer files for Chap-
ter 7, but can be paid in installments during a Chapter 13 case. When Chicago identi-
fied drivers with large outstanding debts and commenced collection efforts, drivers may
have preferred Chapter 13 because it has lower up-front costs. We show that liquidity
constraints cannot explain the post-Emanuel policy increase in Chapter 13 filings among
African Americans. First, our regressions include individual-level controls that account
for available liquidity (such as monthly income as well as assets and secured debt). More
importantly, we study the response to the Emanuel policy among consumers who were rep-
resented by a pro-bono law firm that charges no legal fees, the Legal Assistance Foundation
(LAF). We find a sharp post-Emanuel policy increase in both the number and proportion
of Chapter 13 filings at LAF. We view this as strong evidence that liquidity constraints, al-
though important to the filing decision generally, are not driving our findings. Instead, the
post-Emanuel policy increase is more plausibly driven by consumer efforts to recover their
licenses. Consistent with this conclusion is evidence that, regardless of race, we see a sharp
post-Emanuel policy increase in the proportion of Chapter 13 cases in which the debtor
was cited for driving without a license during the 12 months preceding the bankruptcy
filing.
Our findings indicate that discrimination by attorneys is, at most, a partial cause of ob-
served racial disparities in bankruptcy. In our data, we observe the same racial disparities
observed in prior work. However, when we include controls for the consumer’s zip code
(reflecting driving distance) and debt to the City of Chicago, the racial disparity shrinks
by 50%. When we include attorney fixed effects, which account for the fact that some
attorneys “steer” all clients to Chapter 13 regardless of race, the racial disparity becomes
less than a tenth of its original size (with at most a two percentage point difference in the
probability of choosing Chapter 13 over Chapter 7).
Although this paper is motivated by racial disparities in consumer bankruptcy, it has
implications for the design of bankruptcy law and public finance. First, our findings in-
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dicate that, although we see racial disparities in bankruptcy, Chapter 13 is used as theory
predicts: debtors—particularly the working poor—use it to retain assets (a) for which the
costs of ownership (through a Chapter 13 repayment plan) are lower than the costs of sub-
stitutes (such as renting comparable assets) and (b) that would be lost in Chapter 7, as
discussed in Li and Sarte (2006) and White and Zhu (2010). In response to the Emanuel
policy, debtors filed Chapter 13 cases to recover their licenses because (a) there are no
substitutes for debtors with long commutes and limited access to alternative modes of
transportation and (b) licenses cannot be recovered through Chapter 7. The racial disparity
is driven primarily by non-bankruptcy policies (such as the City of Chicago’s enforcement
policies), not by attorney discrimination. Second, our findings indicate that the Emanuel
policy triggered an increase in Chapter 13 filings, especially by African Americans, because
(i) the Bankruptcy Code permits the discharge of fees and fines only in Chapter 13, not in
Chapter 7; (ii) the city’s lax enforcement policy allowed residents to accumulate debts that
could not be managed without a bankruptcy filing; and (iii) there is no statute of limitations
applicable to fines arising from traffic debts. Reforms along any one of these dimensions
would have a substantial effect on the propensity to file for Chapter 13.
Our paper contributes to the literature on racial discrimination in bankruptcy courts,
summarized by the American Bankruptcy Institute (2019). We also contribute to a large
literature in sociology and (to a lesser extent) economics that explores the extent that dis-
tance to work or other amenities (such as supermarkets) is greater for the poor, especially
African Americans. A persistent theme in this “spatial mismatch” literature is that African
American households face substantial disadvantages in commuting to work, as discussed
in O’Regan and Quigley (1999) and Kneebone and Holmes (2015).2
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background on bankruptcy law
and prior research on the relationship between commuting distance and race. We also
describe the natural experiment presented by the Emanuel policy. Section 3 presents our
data and summary statistics. We present our results in Section 4. The concluding Sections
2For example, Andersson et al. (2017) find that a recently unemployed consumer is more likely to find
new employment if she lives closer to available jobs, and the effect is substantially larger for African
Americans and those living in high-poverty areas.
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5 and 6 assess the implications of our findings for the attorney “steering” hypothesis and
for policy more generally.
2 Background: Bankruptcy Law and Chicago Policy
2.1 Bankruptcy Law
The United States Bankruptcy Code offers two primary options for distressed con-
sumers seeking to discharge their debts. One is Chapter 7, which offers the consumer a
discharge of most debts if the consumer agrees to liquidate “non-exempt” assets and dis-
tribute the proceeds to creditors. Every state “exempts” certain assets, which the consumer
can keep even after debts are discharged. In Illinois, for example, an unmarried consumer
can exempt up to $15,000 of home equity, $2,400 of the value of a motor vehicle, and $4,000
of any personal property (exemption limits double for married couples who file a joint
bankruptcy petition). The latter amount can be applied to the motor vehicle, allowing the
consumer to exempt up to $6,400 of the vehicle’s value. Thus, if the consumer owns a
car that is worth less than $6,400 (“exemption limit”), and there is no lien on the car, the
consumer can keep the vehicle even after her debts are discharged in Chapter 7. If the car
is worth more than the exemption limit, it will be sold and the exempt value distributed to
the consumer. If the car has a lien on it, it will be sold, the proceeds paid to the secured
creditor, and any excess paid to the consumer, up to the exemption limit.
The other option for a distressed consumer is Chapter 13, which offers a discharge if the
consumer distributes all of her disposable income to creditors for three to five years (three
years if the consumer has sufficiently low income). The Chapter 13 discharge is broader
than the one offered by Chapter 7. For example, Chapter 13 discharges civil fines, such as
traffic and parking debts, something not possible in Chapter 7. A consumer who files for
Chapter 13 can also retain all of her assets. If a creditor (including a government agency)
has seized an asset, the consumer can demand its return in most states.3 Although all
3There is some disagreement among courts whether the government must return an impounded vehicle.
The majority of courts that have considered the question, though, hold that the government must do so. See
In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019).
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assets—exempt or non-exempt—are retained, it still matters whether the assets are exempt.
The value of non-exempt assets determines, in part, the minimum payoff that the consumer
must distribute to creditors during the five-year repayment period.4
The principal advantage of Chapter 13 is, therefore, the ability to retain assets. Prior
scholarship, such as White and Zhu (2010), has focused on the ability to retain a home,
but retaining a vehicle may be just as important. Additionally, a consumer can retain non-
conventional “property” such as a driver’s license, if it was seized on account of unpaid
debts. Thus, for a car owner, Chapter 13 has three distinct advantages relative to Chapter 7:
(i) retention of the vehicle, (ii) recovery of a suspended license, and (iii) discharge of debts
arising from parking and traffic fines.5
The principal disadvantages of Chapter 13 are its cost and success rate. Relative to
Chapter 7, it is substantially more expensive, as discussed in Morrison and Uettwiller
(2017). Attorney fees average about $1,000 in Chapter 7 but $2,600 in Chapter 13 (with a
very large standard deviation). Additionally, consumers often must pay substantially more
to creditors (over the course of a three to five-year repayment period) in Chapter 13 than
in Chapter 7. Although it costs more than Chapter 7, Chapter 13 is less likely to yield a
discharge of debt. A debtor fails to receive a discharge in two thirds of Chapter 13 cases,
but in less than three percent of Chapter 7 cases, as discussed in Greene, Patel, and Porter
(2017). For a car owner, then, Chapter 13 is a high-cost bankruptcy option with a low
expected success rate.
4In practice, however, this minimum payoff floor is unlikely to be binding because of the requirement that
the consumer pay all of his or her disposable income. Morrison and Uettwiller (2017) provide more
background on Chapter 13 and the ways it differs from Chapter 7.
5Technically, it may be possible to recover a suspended driver’s license by filing for Chapter 7, which
would discharge other debts, thereby freeing up cash to pay parking and traffic fines. This strategy would be
feasible only for debtors with sufficient cash flow to pay the fines. Because the average debt owed to the City
of Chicago is over $1,000 among Chapter 13 filers and about 40% of these filers have income below 150% of
the poverty line, this strategy seems infeasible for a large proportion of Chapter 13 filers. Additionally, only
0.1% of Chapter 7 filers have debts to the City of Chicago, suggesting that the strategy is rarely employed by
these filers. To be sure, given much higher attorney fees in a Chapter 13 case, this strategy would be attractive
if the City of Chicago offered sufficiently generous repayment plans allowing consumers to pay debts slowly
over time. Currently, the city does offer a repayment plan, but consumers with suspended licenses must make
a down payment equal to 25% of outstanding debt plus 100% of outstanding fees for booting, towing, etc. See
City of Chicago, Department of Finance (2018).
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2.2 Chicago Policy
Rahm Emanuel became Chicago’s Mayor in May 2011. In October of that year, he
issued a press release announcing that “his administration will implement a new aggressive
approach to improve collections owed to the city, including millions of dollars in unpaid
parking tickets, unpaid fees, fines and penalties. The reforms are anticipated to bring in
up to an additional $33 million in collections in 2012.” City of Chicago (2011). The press
release explained that, in the past, billing and collection were fragmented across several
city departments. The new policy would, among other things,
“improve collections by consolidating debt types for individuals who owe for more
than one type. [The Mayor] will also call for contracted collection agencies to increase
rates to recover $5 million in debts. For example, there is one Chicagoan who owes
$87,000 in parking tickets on four different license plates that go back to 2005, $70,000
on one plate alone. This case is now in the hands of a city law firm.”
The process for enforcing parking and traffic debt in Chicago has several stages (as
described by City of Chicago, Department of Finance (2018)). A driver first receives a
notice of violation after the city detects a parking or traffic violation. If the driver does
not contest the violation within 21 days, he or she receives a “notice of determination,”
which represents a debt to the city. The debt must be paid by a specified deadline; if it
is not, the debt is doubled and the driver is sent a “notice of final determination,” which
may add fines and penalties to the original debt. When a driver accumulates three or more
“final determinations” (or if two determinations are at least a year old), the city will send
a “notice of seizure” (SEIZ), which alerts the driver that the city will boot and impound
her car if she does not pay the debt within 21 days. The car will be impounded by the city
until it receives payment of the outstanding debt, plus towing and daily storage fees. If
the vehicle is not redeemed within 15 days, the City can sell or destroy it. When a driver
accumulates final determinations for at least ten parking tickets or five automated camera
violations, the city will send a “notice of impending driver’s license suspension” (DLS).
If the driver does not pay outstanding debts, the city will alert the State of Illinois that it
should suspend the driver’s license. The license remains suspended until the city alerts the
state that the outstanding debt has been paid.
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There are, therefore, two principal tools by which the city enforces parking and traffic
debt: vehicle seizures (SEIZ) and license suspensions (DLS). Through FOIA requests, we
obtained data on the number of SEIZ and DLS notices by zip code in Chicago from 2008
through mid-2016. We also received total debt related to parking and traffic tickets (DEBT),
by zip code. Figure 1 plots these data by year. There is a sharp change in trend for DLS,
which had been declining prior to 2011. SEIZ remains relatively flat. It appears, then, that
the city’s policy primarily operated along the dimension of license suspensions. The trend
in DLS is mirrored in total debt (DEBT) in Figure 1, which shows a sharp increase after 2011.
As we show in the Appendix, it appears that, beginning in 2011, the city began collecting
long-overdue debts (especially tickets issued more than 7 years ago) and increased ticket
prices (see Figure D.4).6
3 Data
Our primary dataset includes information about consumer bankruptcy filings in Chicago
during 2008 through 2016. We link two data sources. One is the Federal Judicial Center
Integrated Database (IDB), which includes information about the consumer’s address (zip
code), capital structure (values of real and personal property and secured and unsecured
debt), and case characteristics, such as filing date and outcome. The other data source is
the CM/ECF Document Filing System for the bankruptcy court for the Northern District
of Illinois, which encompasses Cook County and nearby counties. We downloaded and
scraped every petition for every Chapter 7 and 13 case filed between 2008 through 2016.
For Chapter 13 cases, we also scraped the docket sheets, proofs of claim filed by the City
of Chicago, BNC Certificates of Notice (providing a list of creditors), and proposed repay-
ment plans. Using these data, we can identify the name and address of each debtor, the
debtor’s occupation and work address, whether any debt was owed to the City of Chicago,
and whether the city took steps to seize the debtor’s car or suspend her license.
We link these bankruptcy data to several datasets, including (i) monthly, zip code-level
data on traffic and parking enforcement in Chicago, (ii) Census data on racial composition
6Figure D.4 uses ticket-level data obtained by ProPublica via a FOIA request. These data are publicly
available at www.propublica.org/datastore/dataset/chicago-parking-ticket-data.
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and commuting times by census tract and zip code tabulation area, and (iii) Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) data on “food deserts,” defined as census tracts in which at least a
third of the tract’s population resides more than a half-mile from a supermarket or large
grocery store.7 We also link our bankruptcy data to a database on arrests in Cook County.
These data, made available by a local vendor,8 include misdemeanor citations for driving
without a driver’s license.
Finally, we impute the race of bankruptcy filers based on their names and addresses.
Data on race by surname is available from the 2000 census; race by first name is avail-
able from an Office of the Comptroller of the Currency database, drawn from mortgage
applications and assembled by Tzioumis (2018); race by census tract is available from the
2010 census. We combine these sources, applying the same algorithm recommended by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2014), to estimate the probability that a person in
our data is African American. We identify a person as African American if our algorithm
predicts a probability greater than seventy percent (our results do not change if we use a
higher cutoff).9
Table 1 summarizes our data, showing that Chapter 13 filings account for about a third
of cases. African Americans account for about forty percent of Chapter 13 filings but less
than twenty percent of Chapter 7’s. Relative to Chapter 7 filers, Chapter 13 debtors have
higher incomes, are more likely to own cars, and are more likely to have secured debt.
We begin by documenting the correlation between distance, race, and bankruptcy in
Chicago. Table 2 stratifies zip codes by distance from work and supermarkets. Distance
from work is defined as the percentage of zip code residents who travel more than 45
minutes to work. Distance from supermarkets (“food desert”) is defined as the percentage
of residents who live at least one mile from a supermarket. We rank zip codes by the
7The FDA provides an alternate definition, identifying tracts in which over a third of the population
resides more than a mile from a supermarket or large grocery store. These definitions apply only to non-rural
tracts. For rural tracts, which are not relevant to this paper, the FDA uses a longer travel time (e.g., 10 miles)
to identify food deserts.
8The data are obtained from Cook County public records and resold by Record Information Services,
https://www.public-record.com/.
9Our results are similar, but weaker and less precisely estimated, when we impute race based solely on
first and last name.
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percentage of residents who either travel at least 45 minutes to work or live in a food
desert. Table 2 reports means for each quintile of this “Distance” ranking.
Chapter 13’s share of bankruptcy filings (“% Chapter 13”) increases nearly monotoni-
cally as we move from the first to fifth quintile, consistent with the hypothesis that Chapter
13 tends to be more attractive to financially distressed consumers when they live in places
where cars are likely an important means of accessing work and amenities. Table 2 also
shows that African Americans are much more likely to live in zip codes with high Dis-
tance rankings. This is consistent with the hypothesis that African Americans are (a) more
likely to live in zip codes where cars are likely an important means of transportation and,
as a result, (b) more likely to file for Chapter 13 when they become financially distressed.
This phenomenon—the correlation of distance, race, and Chapter 13 filing rates—can be
observed in other cities, such as Atlanta and Memphis, which have been the focus of aca-
demic and media reports because African Americans account for a disproportionate share
of Chapter 13 filings relative to Chapter 7. This is illustrated by Figures E.4 and E.5 in the
Appendix.
4 Evidence from the Policy Change
We hypothesize that African American bankruptcy filers are, on average, more likely
to file a Chapter 13 petition than other debtors because (i) they are more likely to accu-
mulate and default on debts that permit creditors to seize assets that cannot be sheltered
in Chapter 7 and (ii) they face higher costs from seizure of those assets. We test these hy-
potheses using the Emanuel policy, which triggered a sudden increase in driver’s license
suspension notices (DLS notices), as shown in Figure 1. Although the process for suspend-
ing a license is mechanical, as described in Section 2 above, the policy had a much larger
impact on African American drivers. This is shown in Figure 2, which plots (i) debt owed
to the City of Chicago and (ii) DLS notices per capita for predominantly African American
and non-African American (“Other”) zip codes in Cook County. A zip code is deemed
“predominantly” African American if African Americans account for at least 50% of its
population; the remaining zip codes are defined as “Other." Figure 2 shows that, among
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African American zip codes, per capita DLS notices roughly tripled after the Emanuel pol-
icy commences in 2011. The increase is smaller (but still substantial) in Other zip codes:
DLS notices roughly doubled during the years following the Emanuel policy.
We view the Emanuel policy as a shock to the probability that drivers, especially
African Americans, would have their licenses suspended by the city government. Licenses
are assets that can be protected through a Chapter 13 filing (and can be recovered, if already
seized), but not through Chapter 7. We hypothesize that the policy caused an increase in
Chapter 13 filings by African Americans, relative to other races. We also hypothesize that
DLS notices were more costly, on average, for African Americans than other drivers because
African Americans rely more heavily on cars for commuting.
4.1 Racial Differences in the Effect of the Emanuel Policy on Bankruptcy Filings
Figure 3 plots total bankruptcy filings by race. Panel (a) compares African Americans
and non-African American (“Other”) filers; Panel (b) compares African Americans to White
filers. The data underlying this figure are drawn from individual-level bankruptcy files. Be-
fore the Emanuel policy went on-line in 2011, total Chapter 13 filings by African Americans
were nearly identical to filings by White debtors. After 2011, we see a divergence, with an
increase in African American Chapter 13 filings in absolute terms and relative to Others.
A very different pattern characterizes Chapter 7 filings, which declined across all races be-
ginning in 2010, with a much sharper decline among non-African American debtors. This
decline pre-dates the Emanuel policy and likely reflects the end of the recession; a similar
decline in Chapter 7 filings is observed throughout the country.
If the Emanuel policy caused an increase in Chapter 13 filings, especially among African
Americans, we should also observe that, among bankruptcy filers, the propensity to select
Chapter 13 should increase for all races after the Policy goes on-line, and this increase
should be larger for African Americans. We test this hypothesis using a standard event-
study difference-in-difference regression, following Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach
13
(2011) and Autor (2003):








µk · A f ricanAmericani · 1[t = k]+
A f ricanAmericani + θt + Xit + ε it
(1)
Here, Bit is equal to one if consumer i filed a Chapter 13 petition in calendar year t, and
equal to zero if she filed for Chapter 7. A f ricanAmericani is equal to one if the consumer
is African American; θt is a vector of calendar year fixed effects; and matrix Xit includes
a variety of controls, including the (log) value of personal property, real property, total
debt, secured debt, and monthly income and expenses.10 The coefficients of interest are
µk, which measure the change in the probability of a Chapter 13 filing among African
Americans, relative to Other Debtors, during the calendar years prior to and following the
year when the Emanuel policy went on-line (2011). Standard errors are clustered by zip
code. The identifying assumption in our model is that, conditional on observables, the
timing of the choice between Chapters 7 and 13 is unrelated to the individual’s race, up to
a constant difference. By interacting A f ricanAmericani with year fixed effects, both before
and after the policy goes on-line, we can assess whether pre-policy trends are (in)consistent
with our identifying assumption.11
Figure 4 presents the µk coefficients from this model (the estimates are reported in
Table 3, column 1). We observe a sudden jump upward, immediately after implementation
of the Emanuel policy, in the relative probability that an African American debtor selects
Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7. By 2013, African Americans bankruptcy filers are five
percentage points more likely to choose Chapter 13, relative to Other debtors.12 The pre-
2011 interactions between A f ricanAmerican and calendar year show little or no evidence
of a pre-Policy trend: the difference between African American and Other debtors is small,
10We avoid zeroes by using the log of the variable plus $1.
11Although we do not have individual-level data for jurisdictions outside of the Northern District of
Illinois, we can run tract-level analysis, comparing outcomes in Chicago tracts to matched tracts outside
Chicago. We run that analysis in Appendix B and obtain comparable results to those reported in the main text.
12The µk coefficients appear to decline in 2015 and 2016, perhaps reflecting a slowdown in enforcement.
Figure 2 shows that DLS enforcement decelerated among African Americans around 2015.
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negative, and generally insignificant. We conclude that the Emanuel policy’s seizure of
driver’s licenses caused an increase in Chapter 13 filing rates, especially among African
Americans. 13
4.2 Mechanisms: Race and Distance
Prior work has argued that racial discrimination by attorneys explains the higher propen-
sity of African American debtors, relative to Others, to file for Chapter 13. Another plausi-
ble hypothesis is that the higher propensity is caused by differences in background charac-
teristics of African American and Other debtors. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis
appears in Figure 5, which plots the ratio of (a) Chapter 13 filings during a given quarter
to (b) DLS notices during the preceding two quarters by zip code. We view this ratio as
a measure of the Chapter 13 “take up” rate among consumers who received DLS notices.
Prior to the Emanuel policy, the ratio was virtually identical for African Americans and
Others. After the Policy goes on-line, we see a divergence in the ratio, with DLS notices
translating into Chapter 13 filings at a higher rate for African Americans than Others. This
pattern suggests that license suspensions could be more costly to African Americans, on
average, inducing them to file for Chapter 13 at a higher rate than Others.
One reason why license suspensions could be more costly for African Americans is
that they are more likely to live in geographic areas with longer commutes to work, su-
permarkets, schools, and other destinations. To explore this hypothesis, we identify “long
commute” debtors who are likely to place relatively high value on their licenses and cars,
and therefore incur relatively high costs from license suspension. We assume a debtor has
a “long commute” if he or she lives in a census tract that is either (a) classified by the FDA
as a food desert or (b) in the top quartile of tracts as measured by percentage of residents
who travel more than 45 minutes to work. Similarly, we define a “short commute” debtor
13Appendix Table E.1 shows that the Emanuel policy caused a shift in the composition of debtors filing for
Chapter 13. The Table presents means for debtors who filed Chapter 13 petitions during the three years
before the Emanuel policy began (2008-10) and for debtors who filed for Chapter 13 during the three years
after (2012-14). Panel A shows that, post-Emanuel policy, Chapter 13 filers are more likely to be African
American, be unmarried, have income below 200% of the poverty line, not own a home, and owe debt to the
City of Chicago. Although there is no change in the proportion of filers who own a car, there is a sharp
increase in the proportion of filers who own a car but not home. As Panel C shows, the majority of these filers
are African American during the post-Emanuel policy period.
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as one who lives in a tract that is not a food desert and is among the bottom 50% of tracts as
measured by percentage of residents traveling more than 45 minutes to work. We estimate
equation 1 separately on each subsample. Figure 6 reports the coefficients, showing rela-
tively small and statistically insignificant effects of the Emanuel policy in short-commute
tracts (Panel (b)), indicating that the policy-response among African American debtors
is indistinguishable from the response among Other debtors (coefficient estimates are re-
ported in Table 3, columns 2 and 3). In long-commute tracts (Panel (a)), by contrast, we
observe a sharp post-policy response among African American debtors relative to Other
debtors.14 This result is consistent with the hypothesis that commuting time is an impor-
tant determinant of Chapter 13 filings, but it is unclear why commuting time matters more
for African Americans than Other debtors living in the same tracts. One possibility is that,
even within a given tract, African Americans have longer commutes.
We explore this possibility by matching African American debtors to observationally
identical Other debtors. Our matching algorithm is standard nearest-neighbor, propensity
score matching with common support and no replacement (the procedure is described in
more detail in Appendix A). Figure 7 illustrates the effect of matching; Table 4 reports the
coefficients. We begin by reproducing the baseline regression in Panel (a). Matching on
controls, as we do in Panel B, has little effect on the estimates, but matching on both census
tract and observables has a marked effect, as we see in Panel (c). When African Americans
are matched to Others who are not only observationally similar but also live in the same
tract, there is a sizable but imprecisely estimated effect in 2012, but no observable effect in
subsequent years. We view this as evidence that although the Emanuel policy had a larger
effect on African Americans, the typical African American debtor has substantially differ-
ent characteristics—especially geographic location—than the typical non-African American
debtor. These differences rendered African Americans more sensitive to the license suspen-
sion policy implemented by Mayor Emanuel and therefore more likely to file for Chapter
13 bankruptcy, which allows them to recover their licenses.15
14We observe the same pattern—no effect in short-commute tracts and large effects in long-commute
tracts—when we drop food deserts and compare tracts with relatively long and short commutes. We also
observe the same pattern when we drop tracts in which one group (African American, Hispanic, or Other)
accounts for more than one-third of the population.
15Our results reflect both responses along the “intensive margin” (increased demand for Chapter 13
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4.3 Alternative Mechanisms
We have focused on one difference between Chapters 7 and 13 that can generate a
preference for Chapter 13 among African Americans: Chapter 13 allows the debtor to
recover seized assets, such as driver’s licenses. Another potentially important difference is
that attorney fees generally must be paid in full before a debtor files for Chapter 7, but can be
paid in installments after a debtor files for Chapter 13. Liquidity constraints, in other words,
can generate a preference for Chapter 13, as documented by Gross, Notowidigdo, and
Wang (2014), among others. Because the Emanuel policy effectively placed thousands of
drivers into default, it increased demand for bankruptcy generally and especially increased
demand for Chapter 13 among liquidity-constrained drivers. Racial differences in liquidity
constraints—not differences in commuting distances—might therefore explain the post-
Emanuel policy increase in Chapter 13 filings among African Americans relative to Others.
This mechanism is inconsistent with the estimates reported in Figure 7, which explicitly
control for liquidity by including (log) income, assets, and debt in the regressions as well
as the matching algorithm. Panel (b), in other words, matches African American and Other
debtors on liquidity.
We can, however, explore the role of liquidity using variation in law firm pricing. One
firm in our sample, Legal Assistance Foundation (LAF), served indigent clients and charged
no legal fees, regardless of chapter choice. Unsurprisingly, LAF’s clients were liquidity
constrained, as Figure 8B illustrates by plotting the median income of cases filed by LAF
clients and by other firms. If liquidity constraints are the primary reason for the post-
Emanuel policy rise in Chapter 13 filings, we are unlikely to observe an increase among
LAF clients. Figure 8A plots the number of cases per year for LAF, showing an increase in
the total number of Chapter 13 filings immediately after the Emanuel policy comes on-line.
Figure 8C plots Chapter 13’s share of filings, again showing a sharp post-Emanuel policy
increase. What is most striking here is that the post-policy increase is sharpest for the
among consumers who would have filed for some type of bankruptcy in the absence of the policy) and
responses along the “extensive margin” (increased demand for Chapter 13 among consumers who were
unlikely to file for bankruptcy in the absence of the policy). Appendix C attempts to isolate responses along
the extensive margin by focusing on consumers who had little or no reason to file for bankruptcy in the
absence of the Emanuel policy.
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debtors with no liquidity constraints, i.e., those represented by LAF. Consistent with the
fact that this pro bono agency selects debtors who are very poor, regardless of race, Figure
8D shows that the post-policy increase is nearly identical for both African Americans and
Other Debtors. We view these patterns as evidence that liquidity constraints do not fully
explain the post-Emanuel policy increase in Chapter 13 filings by African Americans.
4.4 Effect on Total Filings
Our analysis has focused primarily on a compositional change: the Emanuel policy
changed the composition of bankruptcy filings, increasing Chapter 13’s share of filings, es-
pecially among African Americans. The Policy had effects on the level of filings as well. To
show show this, we construct a synthetic control group of non-Chicago zip codes, located
anywhere in the US, that are the nearest-neighbor matches for the Chicago zip codes in
our data. We match Chicago and non-Chicago (“Control”) zip codes using 2010 census
data, including bankruptcy filing rate, Chapter 13’s share of bankruptcy filings, median
income, percent of residents below the poverty line, and percent of residents who were
African American.16 Figure 9 shows the annual per-capita filing rate for Chicago and Con-
trol zip codes. Panels (a) and (b) split the zip codes by race, with African American zip
codes defined as those where African Americans account for over half of the population.
Panel (a) shows little discernible difference in Chapter 7 filing rates between Chicago and
Control zip codes during the post-Emanuel policy period, though African American filings
in Chicago decline less sharply than filings in the Control zip codes. Panel (b), by contrast,
shows a large difference in Chapter 13 filings, for both African Americans and Others:
filing rates in Chicago diverge sharply from the Controls during the post-Emanuel policy
period. Panel (c) shows the per capita filing rate for all types of bankruptcy, regardless of
race. We see that the post-policy increase in Chapter 13s prevented total filings in Chicago
from declining as sharply as they did in the Control zip codes.
We can use a simple difference-in-difference estimator to calculate the extent to which
the Emanuel policy elevated total filings in Chicago relative to the Control zip codes. Table
16Section A of the Appendix describes the matching procedure in detail.
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4 shows that, without the Emanuel policy, per capita bankruptcy filings in Chicago would
have been .001 percentage points lower. Put differently, relative to the mean per capita
filing rate in Chicago (.00431), filings in Chicago would have been over 20% lower in the
absence of the Emanuel policy. Among African Americans, filings would have been over
35% lower.
To put this into perspective, there were about 17,000 bankruptcy filings in Chicago
during 2012. Our estimates indicate that nearly 4,000 of these filings were caused by the
Emanuel policy.
5 The Relative Importance of Attorney “Steering”
Our analysis shows that selection effects are an important explanation for racial dis-
parities in consumer bankruptcy because Chapter 13 is attractive to consumers seeking to
protect key assets such as automobiles and driver’s licenses. Because of geographic dis-
parities, including relatively longer commuting times, African American bankruptcy filers
place a higher value on those assets than filers in other racial groups and, therefore, are
more likely to file a Chapter 13 case.
Our data point to another potential selection effect: Chicago-area attorneys often spe-
cialize in one type of bankruptcy case (Chapter 7 or 13), and the attorneys who favor
Chapter 13 are also the attorneys most often used by African American debtors. Indeed,
two attorneys (Geraci and Semrad) account for nearly eighty percent of Chapter 13 filings
by African Americans. To the extent that consumers select attorneys based on factors that
are unrelated to their underlying case characteristics—such as distance (Lefgren, McIntyre,
and Miller (2010)) or social networks (Miller (2015))—we may observe racial disparities in
Chapter 13 simply because African Americans select attorneys who favor Chapter 13 and
do so regardless of race.
Table 5 explores racial disparities in Chapter 13 after accounting for these potential
selection effects. These regressions analyze the subset of Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy
cased filed by African American and non-African American, non-Hispanic consumers—
the comparison drawn in prior literature. Pro se filings are excluded because our goal is to
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assess how much of the racial disparity in bankruptcy is attributable to law firm behavior.
Columns (1) and (2) run a simple regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one if the consumer chose Chapter 13 (and equal to zero if she chose Chapter 7);
the only regressor in Column (1) is the consumer’s race, while Column (2) adds time fixed
effects. Both columns yield roughly the same coefficient, showing that African Americans
are about 25 percentage points more likely to file a Chapter 13 case, relative to non-Hispanic
consumers. This coefficient is consistent with prior literature, such as Braucher, Cohen, and
Lawless (2012), which finds a 26.1 percentage point difference between African American
and White Chapter 13 filing rates (see Table 2 of that paper). Column (3) adds attorney
fixed effects, which account for the possibility that some consumers tend to select attorneys
with strong preferences for one style of bankruptcy. This control, by itself, reduces the size
of the African American coefficient by over fifty percent (from 0.25 in Column (1) to 0.10 in
Column (3)). Columns (4) and (5) rerun the analysis on two subsamples. “No COC Debt”
is the subsample of consumers with no debt owed to the City of Chicago; “COC Debt”
is the subsample with such debt. We create these subsamples in order to account for the
selection effect documented in this paper: Chapter 13 is particularly attractive to consumers
who owe debts to the City of Chicago and are therefore at risk of having their cars seized
or licenses suspended. Once we separate the two subsamples in this way, the coefficient
on the African American dummy drops by fifty percent again (from 0.10 in Column (3) to
about 0.05 in Columns (4) and (5)).
Finally, in Columns (6) and (7), we rerun the analysis, but include zip code fixed effects,
which help account for differences in commuting time across zip codes. This control causes
the African American dummy to fall by over fifty percent again. Thus, with the full battery
of controls, Chapter 13’s share among African American consumers is only one or two
percentage points higher than among non-Hispanic consumers. Selection effects might,
therefore, be the primary driver of perceived racial disparities in bankruptcy.
6 Conclusion
It is well-understood that Chapter 13 is most valuable to distressed consumers hop-
ing to retain assets they would lose in Chapter 7 or outside of bankruptcy. That well-
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understood phenomenon provides an (at least partial) explanation for racial disparities in
bankruptcy, as illustrated by Chicago’s Emanuel policy. As the city increased the rate at
which it seized driver’s licenses and cars, residents increased the rate at which they filed
for Chapter 13, which allows immediate recovery of these assets and permits discharge
of city debt, neither of which is possible in Chapter 7. The increase in Chapter 13 filings
was largest for African Americans, who are more likely to incur city debt and who ap-
pear to experience larger costs from asset seizure because they have longer commutes to
work and other amenities. Thus, racial differences in debt burdens and in the costs of debt
enforcement help explain well-documented racial disparities in bankruptcy filings.
Our findings suggest that Chapter 13 plays an important role in allowing the working
poor to retain access to transportation. In this paper, Chapter 13’s importance is driven, in
part, by a quirk of the bankruptcy code: fines, such as parking tickets, can be discharged in
Chapter 13, but not in Chapter 7. But even if this rule were eliminated, Chapter 13 would
remain important to the working poor because it permits consumers to retain (and recover)
assets that are vulnerable to collection by creditors. For example, a Chapter 13 filing allows
a consumer to retain a vehicle that might otherwise be seized by a lender. Because of
Chapter 13’s importance to the working poor, it is puzzling that the same rules apply to
both poor and non-poor debtors. For example, bankruptcy courts often require debtors to
pay a minimum recovery to unsecured creditors (e.g., ten percent of outstanding debt).17 A
requirement like this renders Chapter 13 infeasible or unsuccessful for many poor debtors,
as shown by Morrison and Uettwiller (2017). Courts might consider relaxing these rules
for the working poor.
Our findings also suggest that, because Chapter 13 may function as the only avenue of
relief for working poor faced with collection efforts (e.g., the Emanuel policy) that threaten
their transportation options, the poor may have very weak bargaining power when they
seek legal representation. Bankruptcy attorneys, therefore, are able to charge substantial
fees for routine cases. Although Cook County is served by a large number of bankruptcy
attorneys, eighty percent of African American debtors are represented by two law firms,
17Technically, this requirement is imposed by Chapter 13 trustees, with court consent, as discussed by
Morrison and Uettwiller (2017).
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suggesting substantial market power. These attorneys can be assured of payment, even
though the vast majority of Chapter 13 cases are dismissed before the debtor completes
the repayment plan, because attorney fees are paid first as the debtor submits payments
pursuant to the plan. Poor debtors, therefore, have weak bargaining power, agree to large
fees, but typically receive no discharge because their cases are dismissed. Bankruptcy
courts might consider limiting Chapter 13 attorney fees, which would help mitigate the
effects of the disparity in bargaining power.
Finally, our findings point to the role of non-bankruptcy policies (such as the City of
Chicago’s enforcement policies) in driving racial disparities in bankruptcy. In Chicago,
these disparities would attenuate if the city were to reform its policies for collecting fines.
Relative to other large cities such as Los Angeles and New York, Chicago allows its resi-
dents to accumulate large balances before taking steps such as seizing a vehicle or suspend-
ing a driver’s license, as discussed in Sanchez and Kambhampati (2018). Not only is the
city slow to collect, but there is no statute of limitations on parking tickets in Chicago (un-
like Los Angeles and New York, which have 5 and 8 year limitations periods, respectively).
Thus, by the time a driver’s license is suspended, the outstanding balance may be much
larger than a consumer’s ability to pay, triggering a bankruptcy filing. If the city were to
act more quickly to collect fines, or if parking tickets were subject to a limitations period,
consumers would have smaller balances when collection efforts commenced and would be
more likely to pay those balances (or enter a repayment plan) without a bankruptcy filing.
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2008 2010 2012 2014
Licenses Suspensions (DLS) Debt
Vehicle Seizures (SEIZ)
Note: This figure summarizes zip-level data obtained through a FOIA request from the City of Chicago. We
calculate total number of license suspensions and vehicle seizures as well as the total value of outstanding
traffic debt owed to the city, by year. We normalize the totals by 2008 values. Thus, this plot shows
enforcement and debt levels, relative to 2008 values. The vertical line identifies the year 2011, when the
Emanuel Policy commenced.
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2008q1 2011q1 2014q1 2017q1
Traffic Debt: AA Zips Traffic Debt: Other Zips
DLS: AA Zips DLS: Other Zips
Note: This figure uses the same zip-code-level FOIA data described in Figure 1, but calculates totals
separately for zip codes that are predominantly African American and for other zip codes (“Other”). The
vertical line identifies the year 2011, when the Emanuel Policy commenced.
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African American Chapter 13 African American Chapter 7
Other Chapter 13 Other Chapter 7

















2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
African American Chapter 13 African American Chapter 7
White Chapter 13 White Chapter 7
(b) African Americans and Whites
Note: This figure uses individual-level data drawn from bankruptcy court records. We
calculate total filings per year by race, where race is imputed using the algorithm
described in Section 3. Panel A compares African American filers to all other
bankruptcy filers. Panel B compares African Americans to White filers. The vertical
lines identify the year 2011, when the Emanuel Policy commenced.
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2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Note: This figure implements our baseline event-study specification, Equation (1) in the main text, and
presents estimates of the interactions (µk) between A f ricanAmerican and year dummies. The omitted year is
2011, when the Emanuel policy was initiated. The dots provide the point estimates; the whiskers show
standard errors. The actual estimates can be found in Column (1) of Table 3.
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2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2014q1 2016q12011q1
African American Others
Note: This figure plots the ratio of (a) number of Chapter 13 filings during the current quarter (q) to (b)
number of DLS notices during the preceding two quarters (q − 1 and q − 2). This ratio is therefore a measure
of the bankruptcy “take up” rate among consumers who have received DLS notices. The vertical line
identifies the year 2011, when the Emanuel Policy commenced.
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2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(b) Short Commute Sample
Note: This figure presents estimates of our baseline event-study specification, Equation (1) in the main text, on
separate subsamples: (a) debtors living in a census tract that is classified by the FDA as a food desert or is in
the top quartile of tracts as measured by percentage of residents traveling more than 45 minutes to work
(“long commute”), and (b) debtors living in a tract that is not a food desert and is among the bottom 50% of
tracts as measured by percentage of residents traveling more than 45 minutes to work (“short commute”).
The dots show estimates of the interactions (µk) between A f ricanAmerican and year dummies. The whiskers
show standard errors. The vertical lines identify the year 2011, when the Emanuel Policy commenced.
Estimates and standard error are also reported in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.
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2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(c) Matching on Tract and Controls
Note: This figure re-estimates our baseline event-study specification, Equation (1) in the main text, on: (a) the
full sample; (b) a sample consisting of African Americans matched to non-African American debtors, where
matching is based on case controls; and (c) a sample consisting of African Americans matched to non-African
American debtors, where matching is based on both case controls and census tract. The dots show estimates
of the interactions (µk) between A f ricanAmerican and year dummies. The whiskers show standard errors.
The vertical lines identify the year 2011, when the Emanuel Policy commenced. Estimates and standard error
are also reported in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.
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LAF Other Law Firms













2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
African American Others
(d) Chapter 13’s Share Among LAF Filings by
Race
Note: This figure presents summary statistics for Legal Assistance Foundation (LAF), a non-profit that
provides bankruptcy representation to indigent clients in the Chicago area. Panel (a) presents total filings per
year by chapter, (b) compares the median monthly income of LAF clients to the income of debtors
represented by other firms, (c) compares Chapter 13’s share of filings at LAF versus other firms, and (d)
shows Chapter 13’s share of filings by LAF by race. The vertical lines identify the year 2011, when the
Emanuel Policy commenced.
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2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2014q1 2016q12011q1
AA: Chicago AA: Control Zips
Other: Chicago Other: Control Zips















2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2014q1 2016q12011q1
AA: Chicago AA: Control Zips
Other: Chicago Other: Control Zips





















2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2014q1 2016q12011q1
Chicago Control Zips
(c) Total Filings
Note: This figure compares filing rates in Chicago zips to rates in a synthetic “Control” group of zips located
throughout the United States. The matching procedure is described in Appendix Section A. Panels (a) and (b)
compare African American and Other zips in Chicago to matched zip codes in the Control group. A zip code
is deemed “African American” if over 50% of residents are African American, based on 2010 census data.
Panel (c) compares total filings, regardless of race, in Chicago and the Control group.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
(a) Chapter 13 Cases
Mean SD
% African American 40.51
Assets 107,214 459,858
Debt 150,654 899,061
Secured debt (among those with this debt) 134,442 982,443
% real estate 44.44
% car owner 82.74
% secured debt 80.80
Monthly income 3,605 14,421
Monthly expense 2,892 4,488
% below 200% of poverty line 37.92
Observations 154,620
(b) Chapter 7 Cases
Mean SD
% African American 17.93
Assets 108,136 233,903
Debt 209,036 5,569,225
Secured debt (among those with this debt) 177,894 286,662
% real estate 45.17
% car owner 75.39
% secured debt 68.30
Monthly income 2,809 6,937
Monthly expense 3,210 59,066
% below 200% of poverty line 50.07
Observations 286,666
Note: Here we present summary statistics for Chapter 13 and Chap-
ter 7 filers in the Northern District of Illinois during our sample
period, 2008 through 2016.
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Table 2: Commuting Distance, Race, and Bankruptcy Filing Rates, by Zip Code, in the Northern


















1 11.86 11.76 0.12 0.64 12.04 0.40 52.61
(2.57) (2.61) (0.66) (1.65) (8.21) (0.35) (5.24)
2 23.31 21.46 2.10 7.98 17.88 1.08 54.69
(3.24) (5.47) (5.15) (19.03) (10.17) (1.38) (5.77)
3 38.90 26.94 15.14 13.10 24.61 1.53 49.27
(5.96) (7.91) (12.44) (20.57) (11.14) (1.23) (9.53)
4 60.62 22.56 48.06 26.78 28.39 2.47 47.87
(6.81) (10.40) (10.99) (32.99) (14.45) (2.29) (10.37)
5 86.60 23.89 81.85 39.06 32.72 3.19 40.88
(10.30) (9.32) (14.22) (35.56) (15.85) (2.68) (9.04)
Obs. 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
Note: This table stratifies Cook County zip codes (n=212) into quintiles of “Distance," measured as the percent
of zip code residents who travel at least 45 minutes to work or live at least one mile from a supermarket (“food
desert”). Within each quintile, we present mean zip code characteristics and associated standard deviations (in
parentheses).
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Table 3: Effect of Emanuel Policy on Chapter 13’s Share of Bankruptcy Filings
Baseline Long Commute Short Commute Matching Matching Within Tract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AA × year=2008 -0.019∗ -0.012 -0.015 -0.013 -0.00050
(0.044) (0.318) (0.688) (0.223) (0.972)
AA × year=2009 -0.0096 -0.010 0.024 -0.0037 0.0030
(0.289) (0.371) (0.459) (0.722) (0.831)
AA × year=2010 -0.0059 0.00042 -0.067 0.0014 0.0059
(0.331) (0.968) (0.091) (0.888) (0.642)
AA × year=2011 . . . . .
. . . . .
AA × year=2012 0.038∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.0072 0.022∗ 0.018
(0.000) (0.001) (0.848) (0.024) (0.179)
AA × year=2013 0.051∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.000064 0.033∗∗ 0.0095
(0.000) (0.000) (0.999) (0.001) (0.501)
AA × year=2014 0.051∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.0015 0.046∗∗ 0.0086
(0.000) (0.000) (0.976) (0.000) (0.545)
AA × year=2015 0.033∗∗ 0.035∗∗ -0.024 0.039∗∗ 0.012
(0.001) (0.002) (0.456) (0.000) (0.350)
AA × year=2016 0.023∗ 0.027∗ -0.059 0.026∗∗ -0.0043
(0.013) (0.020) (0.142) (0.007) (0.759)
Zip or Tract Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Case Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 259,390 116,652 31,539 154,225 55,259
Note: This table presents estimates of model 1, which predicts the probability that a bankruptcy filer chooses
Chapter 13 (instead of Chapter 7). Column (1) estimates the model on the full sample, Columns (2) through (5)
re-estimate the model using different subsamples. Column (2) limits the sample to consumers living in “long
commute” census tracts, defined as tracts either (a) classified by the FDA as a food desert or (b) in the top quartile
of tracts as measured by percentage of residents who travel more than 45 minutes to work. Column (3) limits the
sample to consumers in “short commute” tracts, defined as tracts that are not food deserts and are among the
bottom 50% of tracts as measured by percentage of residents traveling more than 45 minutes to work. Columns
(4) and (5) limit the sample to African American consumers and matched non-African Americans. Column (4)
matches on observables; Column (5) matches on observables as well as census tract. Parentheses present p-values;
the symbols have the following meanings: ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Effect of Emanuel Policy on Total Filings
Per Capita Number of Cases All Zips African American Zips Other Zips
(1) (2) (3)
Chicago 0.00081∗∗ 0.0024∗ 0.00057∗
(0.008) (0.038) (0.018)
Post-Policy -0.00089∗∗ -0.00035 -0.0012∗∗
(0.000) (0.172) (0.000)
Chicago × Post-Policy 0.0010∗∗ 0.0035∗∗ 0.00053∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.022)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.00431 0.00914 0.00383
Zip Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,320 320 1,000
Note: This table implements a simple difference-in-difference (DD) regression to
estimate the effect of the Emanuel Policy on total filings in Chicago. We first match
each Chicago zip to its nearest-neighbor zip, located anywhere in the United States
(Appendix A describes the matching procedure). We regress the total filings per
capita on a dummy for Chicago (Chicago), a dummy identifying years after the
Emanuel Policy goes on-line (Post-Policy), the interaction between Chicago and Post-
Policy, and case controls. The coefficient of interest is Chicago × Post-Policy. Column
(1) estimates the DD model on the full sample; columns (2) and (3) reestimate the
model on African American zip codes and Other zip codes, respectively. A zip
code is deemed African American if 2010 census data indicate that at least 50% of
residents were African American. Parentheses present p-values; the symbols have
the following meanings: ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗ p < 0.01.
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African American 0.25∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Year-Quarter No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Law Firm No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 213,263 213,263 205,103 137,540 63,607 137,540 63,607
Note: This table shows that a dummy for race (African American) is large and highly signifi-
cant in regressions that do not account for selection effects, but drops substantially in size in
regressions that do. In each column, we estimate the probability that a bankruptcy filer selects
Chapter 13 (instead of Chapter 7). Column (1) is a simple regression using the full sample,
but includes no controls other than African American. Column (2) adds case controls. Column
(3) adds attorney fixed effects, which account for the fact that some law firms specialize in
Chapter 13, regardless of race. Columns (4) and (5) split the sample between debtors with
debt to the City of Chicago (COC) and those without such debt. These cuts recognize that
Chapter 13 is attractive to debtors with COC debt, regardless of race. Columns (6) and (7)
repeat the analysis, but include zip code fixed effects, which account for differences across
debtors in travel time and other zip-level demographics. Parentheses present p-values; the




A Procedure for Matching Individuals and Zip Codes
We perform two types of matching in this paper. We conduct individual-level matching
to explore the possibility that, once we limit our sample to African Americans and Others
who are comparable on observables (including driving distance), the effect of the Emanuel
policy may disappear. The analysis based on this matching is reported in Section 4.2. We
also conduct zip code-level matching to explore the effect of the Emanuel policy on total
filings in Chicago relative to a synthetic control group consisting of matched zip codes
outside Chicago. The analysis based on this matching is reported in Section 4.4.
For both types of matching, we implement propensity score matching using the Stata
package psmatch2 Version 4.0.11. We used nearest-neighbor matching with common sup-
port and no replacement.
We used a probit regression to estimate the propensity score. In the case of individual-
level matching, the dependent variable was a dummy equal to one if the individual was
African American and zero otherwise. The independent variables included case controls
(such as assets, liabilities, and monthly income and expenses) from the Federal Judicial
Center Integrated Database (IDB). In some specifications, we also matched on census tract
fixed effects. Table E.2 shows the covariate balance between African American and Other
filers after matching on individual characteristics (Panel B) and after matching on both
individual characteristics and census tract (Panel C).
When we conducted zip code-level matching, the dependent variable equaled one if a
zip code was located in the city of Chicago and zero otherwise (i.e., if the zip code was
anywhere else in the United States). The controls included zip code-level variables such as
percentage African American, percentage Hispanic, median household income, percentage
living in a food desert, percentage traveling over 45 minutes to work, per capita number of
Chapter 13 filings in 2010, and Chapter 13’s share of consumer bankruptcies in 2010. Table
E.3 shows the covariate balance between the two groups.
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B Estimation Using Zip Code-Level Data
In the main text, we analyze the Emanuel policy using individual-level data from Cook
County. An alternative strategy is to estimate, at the zip code level, Chapter 13’s share
of bankruptcy filings during the months before and after Emanuel took office as Mayor.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to use data from other counties as
a control group (we do not have individual-level data for counties outside Cook). We
can run a triple-difference regression that estimates the change in Chapter 13’s share (i)
after Mayor Emanuel took office (ii) among African American zip codes relative to non-
African American zip codes (iii) in Cook County zip codes relative to zip codes in counties
unaffected by the change in Mayor Emanuel’s policy (“Control Zips”). This specification is
estimated by the following equation:
Ozq = AAz + Post-Emanuelq + Cookz+
AAz · Cookz + AAz · Post-Emanuelq + Post-Emanuelq · Cookz+
AAz · Post-Emanuelq · Cookz + εzq
(2)
where Ozt is Chapter 13’s share of bankruptcy filings in zip code z during quarter q; AAz
indicates whether the zip code is predominantly African American; Cookz identifies zip
codes in Cook County; and Post-Emanuelq identifies quarters after Mayor Emanuel took
office. We define a zip code as “African American” if African Americans account for at
least seventy percent of the population.
We select Control Zips from throughout the United States using nearest-neighbor match-
ing: For each Cook County zip code, we use propensity-score matching to select three zip
codes outside Cook County (“nearest neighbor”) that are most similar in 2010 (the year
before Mayor Emanuel took office) along the following dimensions: Chapter 13’s share of
bankruptcy filings, per capita Chapter 13 filing rate, percentage of residents who commute
more than 45 minutes to work, percentage of residents living within a food desert, percent-
age African American, percentage Hispanic, median household income, and percentage
of population with income less than $15,000 per year (an approximation of the poverty
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line).18.
Figure D.1 presents the raw statistics, plotting the share of Chapter 13 for Cook County
(“treatment”) and Control Zips (“control”). Treatment and control track each other closely
through 2010, but then diverge, with an increase in Cook County relative to Control Zips.
Table E.6 implements the model in equation 2. We begin with simple models that
account only for race, geography (Cook County versus other locations), and a time trend
centered on the end of the recession. Column (1) confirms that, across all zip codes, Chapter
13 accounts for a substantially larger share of bankruptcy filings (21 percentage points
larger) in African American zip codes than in other zip codes. Column (2) shows that
Chapter 13’s share is larger (by about 8.8 percentage points) for African Americans living
in Cook County than African Americans living elsewhere. To put this into perspective,
Chapter 13’s share of bankruptcies in Cook County during 2010 was 44 percent in African
American zip codes and 19 percent in other zip codes; outside Cook County, Chapter 13
accounted for 40 percent of filings in African American zip codes and 19 percent in other
zip codes.
Column (3) estimates our main specification, equation 2, where the coefficient of inter-
est is the triple-interaction, African American x Post-Emanuel x Cook. This is our difference-
in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimator. Although Chapter 13’s share during the Post-
Emanuel policy period is declining on average across all zip codes (Post-Emanuel), it is
increasing in Cook County relative to zip codes outside the county, consistent with the
hypothesis that the Emanuel policy elevated Chapter 13 filings in Cook County. The triple
interaction indicates that the policy caused a 4.4 percentage point increase in Chapter 13’s
share of bankruptcies in African American zip codes relative to other zip codes in Cook
County, relative to the same difference in other counties. This is a ten percent increase
relative to Chapter 13’s share of filings in Cook County African American zip codes during
2010.
18We have verified that our results are virtually the same (but less precise) when we limit the Control Zips
to one nearest-neighbor for each Cook County zip code. Our results are also the same when we exclude Cook
County zip codes with propensity scores that fall outside the maximum and minimum of the Control Zip
propensity scores.
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Columns (4) and (5) add zip code and year fixed effects. Zip code fixed effects account
for heterogeneity across zip codes, which may be particularly important in this setting,
where the control zip codes are drawn from different counties. In both columns, the DDD
estimates decline slightly (to about 3.5 percent), but still represent about an eight percent
increase relative to Chapter 13’s share in 2010.
C Heterogeneity in Policy Impact
In this appendix, we identify two margins along which we expect to see relatively large
or small effects, assuming the Emanuel policy caused an increase in Chapter 13 filings.
We expect to see little or no effect among consumers who did not own cars and there-
fore were largely unaffected by the policy. However, because we measure car ownership
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the absence of car ownership does not imply the ab-
sence of an effect. The consumer could have lost her car due to the Policy, but filed for
bankruptcy after the car had been seized and sold off (making it impossible to recover). To
address this possibility, we analyze the subset of consumers who both (a) list no car own-
ership and (b) do not list any debt to the City of Chicago at the time of their bankruptcy
filings. Figure D.2 reports estimates from running Equation (1) on this subsample, showing
no positive effect of the Emanuel policy on the relative likelihood of African Americans to
file for Chapter 13. If anything, they become less likely to file.
On the other hand, we expect to observe large effects among distressed consumers
who (a) saw little benefit to bankruptcy prior to the policy change but (b) obtained a
large benefit afterward. Potential proxies for (a) are income and assets. Bankruptcy is a
legal device for protecting income (in Chapter 7) and assets (in Chapter 13) from creditor
collection efforts. Consumers with meager income and assets (“low benefit debtors”) derive
less benefit from bankruptcy, which is in part why Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2001),
among others, have called bankruptcy a “middle class phenomenon.” A potential proxy
for (b) is occupation: consumers with jobs that require a license or a car (e.g., taxi drivers)
are much more likely to benefit from Chapter 13 if these assets are seized through the
Emanuel policy.
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Figure D.3A implements our proxy for (a). Here, we define “low benefit debtors”
as those who are not homeowners, have no secured debt, have no non-exempt property,
and have annual income below 150% of the poverty line. By limiting the sample to non-
homeowners, we exclude one of the principal reasons for using Chapter 13 (to save your
home), as discussed in White and Zhu (2010). Similarly, by excluding consumers with
secured debt, we rule out another common reason for using Chapter 13: to protect assets
from foreclosure. Non-exempt property consists of assets that would be liquidated in
Chapter 7 (every state allows consumers to retain certain assets—“exempt property”—even
if they file for Chapter 7; the remaining assets are called “non-exempt”). If a consumer has
no non-exempt property, she has no assets that are at risk of liquidation in Chapter 7.
Equivalently, she has no assets that can be protected through a Chapter 13 filing. Finally,
by focusing on debtors with low incomes, we limit our sample to consumers who have
relatively small incentive to use any form of bankruptcy, because they are unlikely to be
subject to creditor collection efforts if they are sufficiently poor. Figure D.3A shows that the
Emanuel policy had a strong effect on “low benefit” consumers, with a sharp post-Emanuel
policy increase among both African Americans and other races.
Figure D.3B implements our proxy for (b), i.e., consumers who saw a large benefit from
Chapter 13 after the advent of the Emanuel policy. Here we analyze the subset consisting of
all “low benefit debtors”, but compare “drivers” to other debtors. We define a consumer as
a “driver” if the bankruptcy petition listed an occupation with the word “driver” in it. We
view this as a proxy for debtors who are highly likely to see a benefit in filing for Chapter
13 if their cars or licenses are seized. Figure D.3B confirms that, prior to the Emanuel
policy, Chapter 13 accounted for a relatively small share (around 20 percent) of bankruptcy
filings by low-benefit debtors, and among these debtors, drivers were about as likely to file
for Chapter 13 as other filers. After the advent of the Emanuel policy, we observe a sharp
separation between drivers and other low-benefit debtors. This separation, however, does
not appear to be larger for African Americans than other races. Our sample is too small
to permit strong inferences, but this (tentative) finding is consistent with our hypothesis
that racial differences in the propensity to file for Chapter 13 reflect differences in the value
placed on transportation. Once we condition on a group of debtors who equally value
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FIGURE D.1: Chapter 13’s Share of Bankruptcy Filings:












2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2014q1 2016q12011q1
Cook County Control Zips
Note: This figure plots Chapter 13’s share of bankruptcy filings among (a) Cook County zip codes and (b) a
synthetic control group consisting of zip codes, throughout the Country, that were matched to the Cook
County zip codes. As discussed in Appendix B, for each Cook County zip code, we selected three zip codes
that were nearest-neighbors as measured by 2010 data. The vertical line identifies the year 2011, when the
Emanuel Policy commenced.








2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015
Note: This figure plots coefficients from estimating our baseline event-study specification (Equation 1 in the
main text) on a subsample of consumers who should be unresponsive to the Emanuel Policy: consumers
whose bankruptcy filings list (a) no car ownership and (b) no debt to the City of Chicago. The vertical line
identifies the year 2011, when the Emanuel Policy commenced.
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2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2014q1 2016q1
Drivers Non-Drivers
(b) Chapter 13’s Share Among “Low Benefit”
Consumers: Drivers vs. Non-Drivers
Note: This figure plots coefficients from estimating our baseline event-study specification (Equation 1 in the
main text) on subsamples of consumers who we hypothesize should exhibit large responses to the Emanuel
Policy. Panel (a) limits the sample to “low benefit” debtors who should derive little benefit from a bankruptcy
filing, absent the Emanuel Policy. These consumers have no homes, no secured debt, no non-exempt property,
and annual income below 150% of the poverty line. Panel (b) also limits the sample to “low benefit” debtors,
but compares those who list the word “driver” in their occupations to those who do not list this word. The
vertical lines identify the year 2011, when the Emanuel Policy commenced.
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Note: These plots use ticket-level data obtained by ProPublica via a FOIA request submitted to the City of




Table E.1: Change in Composition of Chapter 13 Filers: Comparing Three Years Before and After
the Emanuel Policy Went On-Line
2008 - 2010 2012 - 2014 t-test
Mean Mean p value
Panel A: All Cases
% African American .35 .40 0.00
% Joint Filing .25 .16 0.00
% Below 200% of Poverty Line .27 .40 0.00
% Homeowner .61 .43 0.00
% Car Owner .83 .83 0.75
% Car Owner but Not Homeowner .33 .50 0.00
% Not Car Owner, Not Homeowner .10 .13 0.00
% COC Debt .34 .55 0.00
Observations 37,437 51,396 88,833
Panel B: Homeowners
% African American .30 .28 0.00
% Joint Filing .35 .29 0.00
% Below 200% of Poverty Line .09 .13 0.00
% Car Owner .87 .88 0.00
% City Debt .23 .28 0.00
Total City Debt ($) 335 789 0.00
Total Assets ($) 267,231 206,695 0.00
Secured Debt ($) 256,837 217,543 0.01
Total Debt ($) 306,905 265,281 0.01
Observations 22,756 20,945 43,701
Panel C: Car Owner but Not Homeowner
% African American .50 .55 0.00
% Joint Filing .08 .06 0.00
% Below 200% of Poverty Line .51 .59 0.00
% COC Debt .50 .73 0.00
Total City Debt ($) 1,528 3,030 0.00
Total Assets ($) 18,647 17,282 0.24
Secured Debt ($) 13,722 11,287 0.00
Total Debt ($) 48,578 48,380 0.74
Observations ($) 8,489 18,654 27,143
Panel D: Not Car Owner, Not Homeowner
% African American .49 .55 0.00
% Joint Filing .02 .02 0.06
% Below 200% of Poverty Line .68 .74 0.00
% COC Debt .55 .78 0.00
Total City Debt ($) 2,373 4,273 0.00
Total Assets ($) 7,061 5,588 0.00
Secured Debt ($) 2,648 1,901 0.28
Total Debt ($) 36,436 38,588 0.06
Observations ($) 2,499 4,728 7,227
Note: This table compares the mean characteristics of Chapter 13 debtors
before and after initiation of the Emanuel Policy in 2011. Panel A presents
statistics for the full sample; the other panels analyze subsamples with dif-
ferent asset ownership profiles. We use two-sided t-tests to test the difference
between pre- and post-Emanuel characteristics.
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Table E.2: Effect of Propensity-Score Matching on Covariate Balance: Individual-Level Data
Panel A: Without Matching
African Americans Others
mean sd mean sd
Assets ($) 70,031.06 466.27 124,686.10 596.84
Debt ($) 115,889.50 570.21 206,061.30 2,076.39
Secured Debt 73,092.83 491.28 133,321.20 722.17
% with Secured Debt 73.20 0.17 72.43 0.14
% with Debt to City of Chicago 44.34 0.20 17.38 0.12
% with Real Estate 37.59 0.19 48.47 0.16
% Car Owner 77.52 0.16 78.48 0.13
Average Monthly Income 2,812.95 6.65 3,125.76 7.94
Average Monthly Expenses 2,553.38 5.82 3,446.65 309.25
% Income Below $15,000 10.12 0.12 11.73 0.10
Observations 64,593 101,207
Panel B: Matched on Case Controls
African Americans Others
mean sd mean sd
Assets ($) 70,039.31 466.34 87,985.54 624.47
Debt ($) 115,903.90 570.29 147,469.30 2,014.67
Secured Debt 73,098.85 491.36 92,922.79 744.38
% with Secured Debt 73.20 0.17 70.31 0.18
% with Debt to City of Chicago 44.34 0.20 22.62 0.17
% with Real Estate 37.60 0.19 35.55 0.19
% Car Owner 77.52 0.16 77.83 0.17
Average Monthly Income 2,812.19 6.62 2,993.96 10.22
Average Monthly Expenses 2,553.33 5.82 2,827.38 6.74
% Income Below $15,000 10.13 0.12 10.84 0.12
Observations 64,581 62,881
Panel C: Matched on Case Controls and Tracts
African Americans Others
mean sd mean sd
Assets ($) 80,384.08 676.89 94,373.09 795.74
Debt ($) 130,208.60 813.04 156,485.50 3,427.68
Secured Debt 85,367.03 698.03 99,911.04 956.24
% with Secured Debt 75.41 0.23 75.09 0.23
% with Debt to City of Chicago 39.04 0.26 30.31 0.24
% with Real Estate 43.08 0.26 45.98 0.26
% Car Owner 79.00 0.21 79.48 0.21
Average Monthly Income 2,964.21 9.28 3,076.46 10.41
Average Monthly Expenses 2,700.89 8.22 2,877.27 8.92
% Income Below $15,000 9.38 0.15 10.08 0.16
Observations 36,393 35,927
Note: This table compares the mean characteristics of African American and
Other debtors before and after applying the matching procedure described in
Appendix A. Panel A presents debtor characteristics before matching; Panel B
analyzes the data after matching on debtor characteristics; Panel C analyzes the
data after matching on both debtor characteristics and census tract.
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Table E.3: Effect of Propensity-Score Matching on Covariate Balance: Zip Code-Level Data
Chicago Control Group Full Sample
mean sd mean sd mean sd
% African American 27.55 4.20 26.78 3.96 8.02 0.10
% Hispanic 21.54 2.73 22.76 3.26 9.09 0.10
Log Median Income 10.86 0.06 10.86 0.07 10.82 0.00
% Food Desert 20.74 3.35 19.76 3.41 20.17 0.19
% Commute More Than 45 Minutes 27.48 1.10 27.46 1.56 16.89 0.07
% Income Below $15,000 15.86 1.04 15.47 1.57 12.97 0.05
# Ch. 13 Cases per 1,000 Residents in 2010 2.01 0.23 1.33 0.25 1.22 0.03
% Ch. 13 in 2010 27.47 1.69 25.51 2.93 26.21 0.15
Observations 66 66 27,853
Note: This table compares the characteristics of Chicago and non-Chicago zip codes, before
and after applying the matching procedure described in Appendix A. The first column shows
summary statistics for Chicago zip codes; the second shows them for matched zip codes; the
third shows them for all non-Chicago zip codes.
Table E.4: Commuting Distance, Race, and Bankruptcy Filing Rates by Zip Code in the Northern


















1 12.94 12.81 0.16 4.58 35.25 1.70 38.69
(3.96) (3.86) (0.59) (9.05) (21.78) (1.56) (5.67)
2 22.87 20.22 2.92 7.73 39.76 1.97 40.29
(3.95) (6.17) (7.00) (12.01) (14.40) (1.13) (5.12)
3 45.90 20.60 30.68 17.83 41.48 2.65 41.29
(7.16) (8.13) (11.89) (22.16) (15.53) (2.01) (4.77)
4 69.61 21.86 60.42 49.72 46.37 3.90 40.63
(7.64) (6.75) (9.49) (33.31) (11.12) (2.60) (6.32)
5 91.82 20.92 89.49 50.80 48.06 3.33 36.18
(6.47) (6.84) (8.48) (27.03) (9.07) (1.91) (7.53)
Obs. 145 145 145 145 145 145 145
Note: This table stratifies Northern District of Georgia zip codes (n=145) into quintiles of “Distance," measured as
the percent of zip code residents who travel at least 45 minutes to work or live at least one mile from a supermarket
(“food desert”). Within each quintile, we present mean zip code characteristics and associated standard deviations
(in parentheses).
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Table E.5: Commuting Distance, Race, and Bankruptcy Filing Rates by Zip Code in the Western


















1 11.41 10.58 0.96 11.37 64.74 4.46 33.33
(2.55) (3.06) (2.61) (14.64) (14.71) (2.16) (3.36)
2 18.03 17.04 1.18 9.63 57.13 3.69 31.53
(3.17) (2.80) (4.41) (13.21) (13.52) (1.21) (3.68)
3 41.88 21.81 25.46 15.69 62.40 4.23 32.84
(11.57) (10.34) (19.90) (16.24) (14.34) (2.55) (3.20)
4 78.14 12.01 74.97 37.78 70.11 8.01 31.13
(6.59) (7.94) (7.53) (29.22) (14.36) (4.67) (4.59)
5 97.40 14.07 96.71 66.31 79.36 12.94 28.19
(3.90) (11.16) (5.17) (34.32) (8.37) (6.41) (6.02)
Obs. 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
Note: This table stratifies Western District of Tennessee zip codes (n=73) into quintiles of “Distance," measured as
the percent of zip code residents who travel at least 45 minutes to work or live at least one mile from a supermarket
(“food desert”). Within each quintile, we present mean zip code characteristics and associated standard deviations
(in parentheses).
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Table E.6: Baseline Regression (Zip Code-Level Data)
% Chapter 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
African American Zip 0.21∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cook County 0.0011 -0.031∗∗
(0.925) (0.004)
× African American Zip 0.088∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(0.000) (0.010)
Post-Emanuel -0.036∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.078)
× African American Zip -0.026∗ -0.018 -0.018
(0.028) (0.119) (0.111)
× Cook County 0.052∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
× African American Zip × Cook County 0.044∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.036∗
(0.005) (0.021) (0.019)
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code Fixed Effect No No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect No No No No Yes
Observations 19,348 19,348 19,348 19,348 19,348
Note: This table estimates Equation (2) using zip code-level data, with each Cook County
zip code matched to three nearest neighbors, located anywhere in the United States. The
dependent variable is Chapter 13’s share of bankruptcy filings. The coefficient of interest
(the DDD estimate) is the final row of the table (Post-Emanuel × African American zip × Cook
County). Parentheses present p-values; the symbols have the following meanings: ∗ p < 0.05
and ∗∗ p < 0.01.
55
